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We study a spatial Prisoner’s dilemma game with two types (A and B) of players located on a square lattice.
Players following either cooperator or defector strategies play Prisoner’s Dilemma games with their 24 nearest
neighbors. The players are allowed to adopt one of their neighbor’s strategy with a probability dependent on the
payoff difference and type of the given neighbor. Players A and B have different efficiency in the transfer of
their own strategy therefore the strategy adoption probability is reduced by a multiplicative factor (w < 1) from
the players of type B. We report that the motion of the influential payers (type A) can improve remarkably the
maintenance of cooperation even for their low densities.
PACS numbers: 89.65.-s, 89.75.Fb, 87.23.Cc, 05.50.+q
I. INTRODUCTION
For the consideration of cooperation among selfish individ-
uals the application of evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
games proved to be a fruitful mathematical background [1]. In
the original two-person one-shot game the equivalent players
have two options [to cooperate (C) or to defect (D)] to choose
and their payoffs depend on their choices. The highest total
payoff is achieved and shared equally if both player choose
C. On the contrary, the players share equally the lowest to-
tal income when both choose defection. The highest individ-
ual payoff is received by the defector against the cooperator
co-player who obtains the lowest individual payoff. The self-
ish players are enforced to choose defection that yields better
score for any choice of the co-player. In the traditional game
theory the players are intelligent, thus both selfish individual
choose defection providing the second lowest income for the
players.
During the last decades the original concepts of game the-
ory [2] were extended for different directions that includes
the introduction of uncertainties, multi-agent repeated games,
evolutionary rules, etc. Due to the progressive research many
ways were discovered how the cooperation can be maintained
in a society of selfish individuals as it is observed in real bi-
ological [3, 4] and human systems [5]. The most relevant
mechanisms supporting cooperation are the kin selection [6],
direct reciprocity [5, 7], indirect reciprocity [8, 9], group se-
lection [10], and spatial systems with short range interactions
between the players [11] (for comparison and further refer-
ences consult the paper by Nowak [12]).
In the spatial evolutionary PD games the players’ payoff
come from games with their neighbors and the players can
adopt a strategy from one of their neighbors with a probability
dependent on the payoff difference. Most of the early works
were concentrated on the evaluation of the average density of
cooperators when varying the model parameters, like the set
of strategies, the evolutionary rules including noises, the pay-
off values, and the structure of connectivity (for a survey see
[13, 14]). It turned out that cooperators cannot remain alive in
the spatial evolutionary PD games if the temptation to choose
defection (defector’s income against cooperator) exceeds a
threshold value dependent on the mentioned parameters. In
contrary to spatial evolutionary PD games, more than 80 per-
cent of payers choose cooperation within the whole range of
payoff parameters in the models suggested by Santos et al.
[15, 16] where the players were located on the sites of a scale-
free network.
For the investigation of human societies the so-called so-
cial networks provide a more appropriate connectivity struc-
ture and different versions of evolutionary PD games were
studied on small-world, scale-free, and other networks too
[17, 18, 19]. An extremely large enhancement in the por-
tion of cooperators is occurring when the evolutionary rule
is controlled by the difference of total incomes that favors the
strategy adoption from those players who have a large number
of neighbors [15, 16]. In these models the players with many
neighbors play a crucial role in the maintenance of cooper-
ation because their strategy is adopted by their neighborhood
and this process is beneficial for cooperators while it decreases
the defector’s income. The same mechanism can occur and
support cooperation for those models where a portion of play-
ers have enhanced activity in spreading their own strategy over
their neighborhood [20]. In real human societies these latter
players can represent influential players and masters as well
as prophets or agitators.
Some enhancement in the density of cooperators was al-
ready reported by several authors who considered the effect of
inhomogeneous strategy adoption probabilities [21, 22, 23].
The most significant increase of the cooperative behavior is
found for those types of inhomogeneities where each player
is characterized by a strategy transfer capability quantifying
the probability of strategy adoption from the given player to
her neighbors [20, 24]. Subsequent investigations have clar-
ified that the efficiency of this mechanism can be improved
if the number of neighbors is increased even for regular con-
nectivity structures [25]. Furthermore, it turned out that the
co-evolution of strategy distribution and strategy transfer ca-
pability yields an inhomogeneity in the strategy transfer activ-
2ity supporting the cooperative behavior [26].
In the present paper the above investigations are extended
to study what happens in a spatial evolutionary PD games if
the number of neighbors is large (24) while the density of in-
fluential players is low. Such a large neighborhood is natu-
ral in social systems. Besides it, the large number of neigh-
bors enhances the phenomenon and allow us to visualize its
main features. For low densities of influential players the di-
rect links between these players are rare. Consequently, the
cooperative behavior cannot spread away through these direct
connections. Now we show that this difficulty can be over-
come if the influential players are allowed to migrate. In this
case the temporary connections between the latter players can
provide suitable conditions for the cooperators to rule over the
whole system.
II. THE MODEL
We consider an evolutionary two-strategy Prisoner’s
Dilemma game with players located on the sites (x) of a
square lattice. Two types of players are distinguished and
their spatial distribution is described by an Ising formalism
(nx = A or B). The portion of players A and B are fixed [ν
and (1− ν)]. The player at site x can follow either an uncon-
ditional cooperator (sx = C) or defector (sx = D) strategy,
denoted also by unit vectors as
sx = C =
(
1
0
)
or D =
(
0
1
)
. (1)
This notation allows us to use a simple matrix algebra for the
definition of the total income Ux of player x coming from PD
games played with her all neighbors y ∈ Ωx, that is,
Ux =
∑
y∈Ωx
s
+
xA · sy , (2)
where s+x is the transpose of the state vector sx, and the sum-
mation runs over all the neighbors of player x. In the present
case each player has 24 neighbors (|Ωx| = 24) located inside
a block of 5 × 5 sites around the central player x. Follow-
ing the notation suggested by Nowak et al. [11] we use the
rescaled payoff matrix:
A =
(
1 0
b 0
)
, 1 < b < 2 , (3)
where we have only one parameter b characterizing the temp-
tation to choose defection. In the present evolutionary PD
game a randomly chosen player x could adopt the strategy
from one of its randomly chosen neighbors y ∈ Ωx with a
probability W [(sx → sy) depending on the payoff difference
and the type of player y [20]. Namely,
W (sx → sy) = wy
1
1 + exp [(Ux − Uy)/K]
, (4)
where K characterizes the uncertainties (stochastic noises) in
the value of total payoff [27, 28, 29] and/or a freedom for
the players to make irrational decisions when adopting a strat-
egy [30, 31]. The multiplicative factor wy defines the strategy
transfer capability of the player y in a way that
wy =
{
1, if ny = A
w, if ny = B . (5)
Players of typeA are considered as influential players who are
capable to convince their neighbors (with a high efficiency on
comparison to players of type B) to follow them in the choice
of strategy.
The system started from a state where a fraction ν of play-
ers (distributed randomly) belong to the type A and the rest of
players are B. In the random initial state the players follow C
or D strategies with equal probability independently of their
types. During one Monte Carlo step (MCS) each player has a
chance once on average to adopt a strategy from one of their
neighbors (chosen at random) as described above. Besides it,
the influential players are allowed to move. More precisely,
after each MCS a fraction f of A players (chosen at random)
can exchange their site with one of the randomly selected
nearest neighbors y if ny = B, that is, (sx, sy) → (sy, sx),
nx = A → B, and ny = B → A. The magnitude of f
characterizes the migration (diffusivity) of influential players.
The simulations were performed on a square lattice with a size
L× L under periodic conditions. After a suitable thermaliza-
tion time tt we have evaluated the concentration ρ of coopera-
tors in the stationary states by averaging over a sampling time
ts. Most of the MC simulations were performed for L = 400,
K = 2.4, and ν = 0.02 for different values of w, b, and f . As
the relaxation (thermalization) time depends on w therefore
tt = ts is varied from 104 to 106 MCS. The longer run time is
used for small values of w when most of the players (of type
B) modify her strategy with a low frequency proportional to
w.
III. MONTE CARLO RESULTS FOR QUENCHED
DISTRIBUTION OF TYPES
First we investigate the system when the motion of players
A is forbidden (f = 0) for a small density (ν = 0.02) which is
significantly lower than the optimum (νopt ≃ 0.2) discussed
in a previous paper [25]. Figure 1 illustrates the main features
of the spatial distribution of strategies and types (sx and nx)
for a low value of w. The snapshot shows clearly that players
of type A are surrounded by players following the same strat-
egy. This means that the income of cooperating As (in short,
AC players) is enhanced by their neighborhood (BC players)
while the defecting As receive a very low payoff. In fact, this
short range correlation (in the strategy distribution) is the rea-
son why cooperators can survive for the given parameters (b
and K) ensuring survival only for defectors in the homoge-
neous system (i.e. for ν = 0 or 1, or for w = 1 at arbitrary
ν).
For such a large neighborhood and a large value of 1/w
one can think that the short-time dynamics (strategy adoption)
between two neighboring A players can be approximated by
introducing an effective payoff matrix as it was described by
3Pacheco et al. [32] when studying the co-evolution of strategy
distribution and connectivity structure. One can observe in
AD: AC: BD: BC:
FIG. 1: (Color online) A typical distribution of the strategies (D or
C) and types (A or B) of players on a square lattice (with a block
size of 100 × 100) for a quenched random distribution of players A
if ν = 0.02, b = 1.25, K = 2.4, and w = 0.001.
Fig. 1 that both the AC and AD players form small colonies.
We have to emphasize that the strategy distribution varies con-
tinuously and due to the stochastic noise even an AD player
can be transformed into AC and vice versa. For the present
low value of ν the overlapping neighborhood of the A play-
ers do not span the whole system. Consequently, the strategy
fluctuations in the intermediate regions play a crucial role in
the coexistence of D and C strategies.
For the quantitative analysis MC simulations were per-
formed to determine the average density (ρ) of cooperators
when varying the payoff parameter (temptation b) for several
values of w while other parameters are fixed. Figure 2 com-
pares six curves describing a monotonous decrease of ρ from 1
to 0 within a coexistence region where 0 < ρ < 1. This means
that only defectors remain alive if bc1(K,w, ν) < b and co-
operators prevail the whole systems if b < bc2(K,w, ν) (both
threshold values depend on the model parameters). The effect
of inhomogeneous teaching activity is practically negligible
if the ratio 1/w is not large enough. Notice that two curves
(obtained for w = 1 and 0.2) practically coincide in Fig. 2.
On the contrary, the density of cooperators as well as the sec-
ond threshold value of temptation (bc2(K,w, ν)) is increased
significantly if w becomes very small. At the same time, the
MC results indicate only a small increase in the first threshold
value of temptation [bc1(K,w, ν)].
If parameters are tuned in the homogeneous (w = 1) spatial
system, then the extinction of cooperators (or even defectors)
exhibits a critical phase transition belonging to the directed
percolation universality class [33, 34, 35]. This means that
the decrease of density follows a power law behavior when
approaching the critical point, that is ρ ∼ |b − bc|β if b→ bc,
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FIG. 2: Average density of cooperators in the stationary state (within
the coexistence region) as a function of b for six different values of
w (from left to right w = 1, 0.2, 0.05, 0.02, 0.005, and 0.002) if
K = 2.4 and ν = 0.02.
where the value of exponent β is determined by the spatial
dimension. The algebraic decrease of ρ is accompanied by a
divergency in fluctuations, correlation length, and relaxation
time (for details see [36, 37]). These features cause technical
difficulties in the accurate determination of ρ because long run
time and large system size are required in the close vicinity of
the critical point. The technical difficulties become more pro-
nounced if a Griffiths-like phase occur in the inhomogeneous
spatial system [38]. This is the reason why data with a small
value of ρ are missing in Fig. 2 for low values of w.
Figure 3 show several examples about how the density ρ(t)
of cooperators evolves towards the final stationary state in the
vicinity of the second transition point. Despite of the large
system size (L = 1800) the vanishing density of cooperators
exhibits some relevant fluctuation preventing the clear visu-
alization of the average behavior in the log-log plot for suf-
ficiently long times. In order to suppress the undesired dis-
turbance of fluctuation the data in Fig. 3 are averaged over a
time window (0.8tn < t < 1.2tn where tn ≃ 2n/2) with an
interval increasing linearly with t. The smoothed data show
clearly that the density of cooperators decrease algebraically
(ρ(t) ∼ t−δ) with an exponent δ > 0 dependent on b. The up-
per curve of this plot illustrates an example where ρ(t) tends
to a finite limit value.
Similar behavior was reported for other simpler models
(e.g., contact process) when considering the extinction of a
species (or any other objects or states) on a quenched inho-
mogeneous spatial background [39, 40, 41, 42, 43]. On the
inhomogeneous backgrounds we can distinguish patches pro-
viding better conditions for the species (henceforth strategies)
to survive. For low densities (ρ) of the disappearing strate-
gies the active territories are separated from each other and
the whole process can be well approximated by the statisti-
cal description of independent extinctions on patches of dif-
ferent sizes. The average life-time increases with the size s
of the mentioned patches while the probability of their ap-
pearance decreases exponentially with s. Noest [39, 40] has
shown that the resulting process yields an algebraic decay. Re-
410-2
10-1
10 0
100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107
ρ
time [MCS]
FIG. 3: Log-log plot of the time-dependence of the density of coop-
erators for different values of b (from top to bottom b = 1.4, 1.45,
1.47, 1.48, 1.49, and 1.51) if w = 0.002, K = 2.4, ν = 0.02, and
L = 1800.
cent theoretical investigations of the random contact process
[44, 45, 46, 47] are focused on clarification of phenomenon
what happens when varying the strength of inhomogeneity
(for a survey see [48]). Similar behavior is expected in the
present model. Unfortunately the numerical confirmation of
the mentioned feature exceeds our computational capabilities.
We have to emphasize, however, that technical difficulties are
reduced if the inhomogeneous background changes continu-
ously. In the latter case the system becomes equivalent to
the homogeneous cases for sufficiently large time- and length-
scales [37, 43] and this feature simplifies the numerical anal-
ysis as discussed below.
IV. MONTE CARLO RESULTS FOR MOVING
INFLUENTIAL PLAYERS
In this section we study the system when a slow motion of
A players is introduced. Most of the subsequent MC data are
obtained for ν = 0.02 when 10 % of players A (f = 0.1) are
allowed to exchange her position with one of the neighbors as
described above. In agreement with the expectations, for such
a slow migration the AC (AD) players are surrounded by co-
operatingBCs (defecting BDs). As a result, at the beginning
of the evolutionary process one can observe a spatial distri-
bution similar to the one plotted in Fig. 1. For slow motion
the given neighborhoods accompany the (central) influential
players. Due to their motion the rare A players can approach
each other and when two of them interact then AC convinces
AD to cooperate with a high probability and within a short
time this new strategy will be adopted by the neighbors, too.
Consequently, the number of AD players decreases gradually
as demonstrated in the upper snapshot of Fig. 4.
In the present model the highest individual income is re-
ceived by a solitary defector because she exploit all her co-
operating neighbors. So the strategy of the solitary defec-
tor of type B can be transferred to her neighborhood unless
FIG. 4: (Color online) Two snapshots on the distribution of the strate-
gies and types of players at times t = 1000 MCS (upper plot) and
t = 10000 MCS (lower) for ν = 0.02, b = 1.25, K = 2.4, f = 0.1,
and w = 0.001. In the final stationary state all the players cooperate.
Notation of colors as in Fig. 1
this player adopt cooperation from a neighboring AC player.
The lower snapshot in Fig. 4 shows a situation when the mov-
ing AC players eliminate the (small) groups of AD players.
Sometimes, however, the strategy of the solitary defector can
be adopted even by a neighboring AC player who will en-
force her neighbors to form a gang of defectors as illustrated
in the lower snapshot of Fig. 4. The formation of the defector
gang reduces the income of the focal AD player who will be
conquered by an AC player opposing her sooner or later and
finally the defection becomes extinct in the whole system.
In order to quantify the efficiency of the above described
mechanism we have determined the functions ρ(b) at f = 0.1.
For the sake of comparison the rest of parameters are equiva-
lent to those used in the previous section. The results plotted
in Fig. 5 are similar to those obtained for quenched distribu-
tions ofA players at their higher densities (e.g., ν = 0.2 [25]).
5The most striking difference between the results of Figs. 2 and
5 is that here the first transition occurs at higher values of b.
In other words, the moving AC players are capable to defeat
those (rare) gangs of defectors which are stabilized for some
quenched constellations. As well as for higher densities of A
players the coexistence region shifts towards the larger val-
ues of b when the strategy transfer capability (w) of B players
is decreased. The results in Fig. 5 indicate a logarithmic in-
crease in the critical values of temptation, i.e., δbc ∼ ln 1/w.
The systematic analysis of this effect (for lower values of w)
is prevented by the long relaxation time increasing with 1/w.
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FIG. 5: Average density of cooperators versus b if the motion of
players A is allowed. Parameters are the same as in Fig. 2 excepting
that here f = 0.1.
The visualization of the evolution of strategy distribution
(for typical snapshots see Figs. 1 and 4) indicates clearly that
the evolutionary process is mainly controlled by the competi-
tion between the moving AC and AD players surrounded by
their own followers. In some sense the situation is analogous
to the case of group (and/or kin) selection [10, 49, 50, 51]. The
fluctuating neighborhood of the moving AC and AD players
induces uncertainties in the final results when they compete
with each other. Besides it, the strategy distribution in the
’nobody territory’ (consisting of sites not influenced by play-
ers A) can also affect the variation of strategy for players of
typeA. All these processes together yield a complex behavior
dependent on the model parameters. In the next section the
effect of mobility (f ) is investigated quantitatively.
V. EFFECT OF MOBILITY
In the limit of large mobility the advantage of the AC play-
ers vanish because they cannot benefit from their followers
left behind during their motion. Furthermore, their fast motion
can be interpreted as a mixing favoring defection (see the re-
sults of mean-field approximation [14]). In the opposite limit
(f → 0) the system is expected to reproduce a behavior dis-
cussed for the quenched distribution of A players. Now we
study what happens when varying the mobility of A players.
For low values of 1/w the small enhancement of coopera-
tion is reduced gradually when f is increased (see the lowest
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FIG. 6: Average density of cooperators as a function of mobility f
for b = 1.15, K = 2.4, ν = 0.02, and w = 0.002, 0.005, and 0.02
(from top to bottom).
data obtained for w=0.02 in Fig. 6). On the contrary, one can
observe a local maximum in the density of cooperators at an
optimum value of f if w = 0.005. The density of cooperators
reaches its saturation value (ρ = 1) within a suitable range
of f if 1/w exceeds a threshold value. For all the three plot-
ted curves the density of cooperators vanishes if f exceeds a
threshold value dependent on the parameters.
VI. EFFECT OF DENSITY OF INFLUENTIAL PLAYERS
Previous investigations [15, 16, 52] have indicated clearly
that on the scale-free graphs the introduction of additional
links between the influential players can suppress the mecha-
nism supporting the emergence of cooperative behavior. Sim-
ilarly, an optimal density ν of A players was found on the
two-dimensional lattices for quenched distribution of players
A and B. It turned out that the optimal value of ν depends
mainly on the number of neighbors but it is also affected by
other parameters (e.g., b and K).
Figure 7 summarizes the results of MC simulations ob-
tained for three different values of b while other parameters
are fixed. The results indicate clearly that optimal density of
influential players is reduced particularly for such values of
b and K where the cooperation can be maintained at a low
level. The lowest curve in Fig. 7 shows clearly the appear-
ance of a maximum at ν = νopt ≃ 0.03 when varying ν if
K = 2.4, b = 1.35, f = 0.1, and w = 0.002 while for these
fixed parameters the cooperators remain alive only within a
range of ν. Similar behavior can be observed when the sur-
vival of C strategy is supported by decreasing the temptation
b. More precisely, the profile of the curve ρ(ν) becomes wider
and higher until reaching the saturation value. Notice that the
cooperators die out for all the three cases plotted in Fig. 7 if
the density of influential players exceeds a value (0.21) close
to the optimum for quenched disorder.
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FIG. 7: Average density of cooperators vs. density ν of influential
players for different values of temptation (b = 1.2, 1.3, and 1.35
from top to bottom) at f = 0.1, K = 2.4, and w = 0.002.
VII. SUMMARY
Within the framework of evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma
games we have studied the improvement of cooperative be-
havior with two types of players (both are following either co-
operation or defection unconditionally) if the influential play-
ers (type A) are allowed to walk randomly through the whole
square lattice. Our analysis is concentrated to systems with
a small portion of influential players where the players have
large neighborhood (n = 24). In these cases the the influential
players and their followers form an apparent group if there is a
relevant difference between the strategy transfer capability be-
tween the A and B players. As a result, the evolution of strat-
egy distribution is governed basically by the competition be-
tween the cooperative and defective influential players in such
a way that the direct PD interaction (payoff) can be replaced
by an effective interaction related to games with re-scaled pay-
offs. Similar phenomenon was described by Pacheco et al.
[32, 53] who studied the co-evolution of strategy distribution
and connectivity structure. Besides it, the processes in the
present model are resembling the kin and/or group selections
[6, 10, 49] supporting cooperation, too. In comparison with
the mentioned models, here the randomly moving groups (in-
fluential players) interact temporarily (if they are sufficiently
close to each other). In the present case the strategy adop-
tion between the influential players are affected by the time-
dependent structure of groups and also by the strategy fluctu-
ations in the territories not affected directly by the influential
players.
Our numerical investigations have clearly shown that the
temporary links between the moving influential players pro-
mote the spreading (and maintenance) of cooperative behav-
ior. In comparison with the case of quenched distribution of
A players, the quantitative analysis has confirmed that higher
level of cooperation can be achieved if the system has less
number of influential players who can move randomly with
an optimal rate.
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